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The Writ of Habeas Corpus and the Special
Court for Sierra Leone: Addressing an
Unforeseen Problem in the Establishment of a
Hybrid Court
DORSEY & WHITNEY STUDENT WRITING PRIZE IN COMPARATIVE AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW OUTSTANDING NOTE WINNER

The hybrid model of internationalcriminal tribunals,
which supplements generalprinciples of international
criminal law with the domestic legal principles of the
host country, has been implemented in myriad nations,
including Cambodia, Kosovo, and Sierra Leone. The
popularity of this model derives in part from its
potential to legitimate international criminal
prosecutions in the eyes of the host country and to
strengthen the domestic legal system of that nation.
However, in creating an obligation to honor
principles of both domestic and internationallaw, the
hybrid model may create inconsistent legal duties
whose resolution could undermine the proper
functioning of an international tribunal. This Note
highlights such a conflict, which stems from a tension
between the temporaljurisdiction of the Special Court
for Sierra Leone and protections accorded by the
Sierra Leonean Constitution. Specifically, this Note
argues that Special Court prisoners who are
imprisoned by the state in Sierra Leone could be
legally entitled to release by writ of habeas corpus.
The Note considers several solutions to the problem,
and argues for three approaches that are grounded
upon respect for the legal traditions of Sierra Leone
and which thus preserve the legitimating and
capacity-buildingfunctions of the hybrid model.
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Reports that say that something hasn't happened are always interesting to me, because as we know,
there are known knowns; there are things we know we know. We also know there are known
unknowns; that is to say we know there are some things we do not know. But there are also unknown
unknowns-the ones we don't know we don't know. And if one looks throughout the history of our
country and other free countries, it is the latter category that tend to be the difficult ones.
Donald Rumsfeld

l

INTRODUCTION

The Special Court for Sierra Leone (The Special Court) 2 has
been enthusiastically embraced as a successful instaritiation of the
"hybrid" model of international tribunals. 3 Under this model, a court
is bound to apply "general principles of international criminal law to
crimes against the peace and security of mankind, and principles of
national criminal law to crimes under domestic law." 4 Such mixedlaw courts have developed in response to the challenge to create a
model tribunal that enjoys international legitimacy but "respects a
1. News Briefing, Donald Rumsfeld, U.S. Secretary of Defense (Feb. 12, 2002),
available at http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2002/t02122002-t212sdv2.html.
2. The Special Court was officially established by a bilateral agreement between the
Government of Sierra Leone and the United Nations that was signed in the Sierra Leonean
capital, Freetown, on January 16, 2002. Act No. 9, Special Court Agreement, 2002
(Ratification Act), reprinted in Supplement to the Sierra Leone Gazette Vol. CXXXIII, No.
22, at 2 (Apr. 25, 2002) [hereinafter Special Court Ratification Act]. For the full text of the
agreement, see Agreement Between the United Nations and the Government of Sierra Leone
on the Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone [hereinafter Special Court
Agreement], sched. to Special Court Ratification Act. The agreement was motivated by a
Security Counsel Resolution requesting that the Secretary-General negotiate an agreement
with the Government of Sierra Leone to create an independent special court. S.C. Res. 1315,
U.N. Doc. S/RES/1315 (Aug. 14, 2000). Its mandate consists of prosecuting "persons who
bear the greatest responsibility for the commission of serious violations of international
humanitarian law and crimes committed under Sierra Leonean law" in connection to the
conflict in Sierra Leone. Special Court Agreement, supra, pmbl. For further information on
the Court's establishment, see generally Celina Schocken, Note, The Special Court for
Sierra Leone: Overview and Recommendations, 20 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 436 (2002); Nancy
Kaymar Stafford, A Model War Crimes Court: Sierra Leone, 10 ILSA J. INT'L & CoMP. L.
117 (2003); Nsongurua J. Udombana, Globalization of Justice and the Special Court for
Sierra Leone's War Crimes, 17 EMORY INT'L L. REv. 55 (2003).
3. See generally Daphna Shraga, Second Generation UN-Based Tribunals: A
Diversity of Mixed Jurisdiction, in INTERNATIONALIZED CRIMINAL COURTS: SIERRA LEONE,
EAST TIMOR, Kosovo, AND CAMBODIA 15, 16 (Cesare P.R. Romano, Andrd Nollkaemper &
Jann K. Kleffner eds., 2004) (noting that the mixed tribunals for Sierra Leone and Cambodia
have inspired the creation of mixed jurisdictions in East Timor, Kosovo, and Bosnia and
Herzegovina); Stafford, supra note 2, at 142 (arguing that "[t]he hybrid model of the Special
Court should be the standard for future war crimes tribunals"); Laura K. Dickinson, The
Promise of Hybrid Courts, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 295 (2003) (arguing that hybrid courts are an
important complement to international and local justice, using the Special Court of Sierra
Leone as an example).
4. Bert Swart, Internationalized Courts and Substantive Criminal Law, in
INTERNATIONALIZED CRIMINAL COURTS: SIERRA LEONE, EAST TIMOR, Kosovo, AND
CAMBODIA 291, 305 (Cesare P.R. Romano et al. eds., 2004).
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nation's vision of justice, its choice of means of bringing it about,5
and its ownership, at least in part, of the judicial process."
Enthusiasm for hybrid courts stems in part from their political
advantages vis-a-vis international tribunals. However, despite the
benefits that derive from the hybrid model's synthesis of domestic
and international law, the model may create inconsistent legal duties
between the court and the host country. In extraordinary cases, these
conflicts of law may undermine the proper functioning of the
tribunal.
This Note argues that Special Court prisoners who are
imprisoned by the state in Sierra Leone could be legally entitled to
release by writ of habeas corpus in spite of their commission of
unconscionable atrocities. This entitlement stems from a conflict
between the protections in the Sierra Leonean Constitution against
imprisonment for pardoned crimes and the temporal jurisdiction of
the Special Court, which vests the Court with the authority to
prosecute crimes committed prior to a general pardon granted under
the Lom6 Accord. The Note considers several solutions to the
problem, and argues for three approaches that are grounded upon
respect for the legal traditions of Sierra Leone. Part I addresses the
political and legal framework in Sierra Leone that gives rise to the
problem, highlighting the amnesty provisions of the Lom6 Accord,
the protections that the Sierra Leonean Constitution guarantees to
pardoned criminals, the sentencing arrangements under the Special
Court Statute, and the writ of habeas corpus in Sierra Leonean law.
Part II considers how a prisoner convicted by the Special Court and
imprisoned in Sierra Leone according to the terms of the Special
Court Statute would be entitled to release upon submitting a habeas
petition to domestic courts, and introduces expedient unilateral
sol-utions to this "habeas problem." 6 Part IH critiques these solutions
5. See Shraga, supra note 3, at 15.
6. In identifying the habeas problem, this Note highlights a novel issue. While the
writ of habeas corpus in Sierra Leonean law and the potential problems that arise from it
point to a serious flaw in the institutional design of the Special Court, no practitioners or
scholars seem to have addressed this problem in published work. Since no defendants have
yet been convicted by the Special Court, none of them have had the occasion to bring a
habeas petition before the Government of Sierra Leone challenging the legality of their
imprisonment. Nor have any individuals challenged the legality of their pre-conviction
detainment in domestic courts as of January 11, 2005. See John R.W.D. Jones et a., The
Special Court for Sierra Leone: A Defence Perspective, 2 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 211, 219
(2004) ("[T]he question arises as to whether a person detained by the Special Court could
apply for habeas corpus before the national courts of Sierra Leone. So far, this has not been
done."); E-mail Interview with Peter Andersen, Spokesman for the Special Court of Sierra
Leone (Jan. 4, 2005) (confirming that no prisoners have applied for a writ before the national
courts as of January 4, 2005) (on file with author). One defendant, Alexander Tamba Brima,
petitioned the Special Court for the writ of habeas corpus. See Prosecutor v. Tamba, Case
No. SCSL-2003-06-PT-05, Ruling on the Application for the Issue of a Writ of Habeas
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by examining the goals of hybrid courts and argues that the
international community should adopt measured solutions to the
habeas problem that honor the legitimating and capacity-building
functions of hybrid tribunals.
I.

BACKGROUND: LEGAL AND POLITICAL ISSUES AFFECTING THE
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE SPECIAL COURT AND THE
GOVERNMENT OF SIERRA LEONE

The legal and political contexts in which the Special Court
was created give rise to a unique threat to its core mandate. This Part
addresses the legal and political tensions between the Special Court
and the State of Sierra Leone that give rise to the habeas problem.
Section A addresses the amnesty provisions of the Lom6 Peace
Agreement and the response of the international community in the
form of the Special Court. Section B highlights the conflict between
the temporal jurisdiction of the Special Court and the protections
afforded under the Sierra Leonean Constitution. Section C considers
the terms of incarceration for prisoners convicted by the Special
Court. Section D demonstrates the existence and articulates the
substance of the writ of habeas corpus in Sierra Leonean law.
A.

The Lome Accord Amnesties and the InternationalReaction

From 1991 to 2002, the civil war in Sierra Leone wrought
unfathomable devastation in terms of lives lost and people
displaced. 7 Three unsuccessful attempts were made to negotiate a
Corpus Filed by the Applicant (2003) (Trial Ct. of the Special Ct. of Sierra Leone)
[hereinafter Brima, Trial Court Habeas Petition]. However, Brima challenged the legality of
his detention on different grounds than those addressed by this Note, contending that his
detention was illegal because his identity was mistaken with that of the person listed in the
indictment, because no valid authority served a warrant to him on the day of his arrest, and
because his indictment is defective under Article 47 of the Court's Rules of Procedure and
Evidence. Brima, Trial Court Habeas Petition, supra, at 3. Therefore, this petition is of
limited relevance to the central thesis of this Note. For further discussion of the Brima
Habeas Petition, see Jones et al., supra, at 219; Jann K. Kleffner & Andr6 Nollkaemper, The
Relationship Between Internationalized Courts and National Courts, in INTERNATIONALIZED
CRIMINAL COURTS: SIERRA LEONE, EAST TIMOR, Kosovo, AND CAMBODIA 359, 370 (Cesare
P.R. Romano et al. eds., 2004). While any attempt to explain why this issue has not
heretofore been addressed is purely speculative, two factors that may contribute to its lack of
treatment include the absence of domestic case law in Sierra Leone and the fact that no
defendants have been prosecuted by the Special Court as of yet. As the habeas issue has not
been sufficiently addressed in prior scholarship, portions of this Note rely heavily on
primary sources.
7.

See generally DANIEL BERGNER, IN THE LAND OF MAGIC SOLDIERS: A STORY OF

WHITE AND BLACK IN WEST AFRICA (2003) (offering a narrative account of the conflict in
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peace agreement between the Government's Civil Defence Forces
(CDF) and the rebel Revolutionary United Front (RUF) before an
effective ceasefire was struck in May 2001.8
The most
comprehensive of these failed ageements was signed on July 7, 1999
in the Togolese capital of Lom69 by Sierra Leone's elected President,
Ahmed Tejan Kabbah, on behalf of the Government. 10
The Lom6 Peace Agreement contained a blanket amnesty
provision for all who were implicated in the conflict,1 I ostensibly in
order to "consolidate the peace and promote the cause of national
reconciliation." 12 This provision mandates that "the Government of
Sierra Leone shall... grant absolute and free pardon and reprieve to
all combatants and collaborators in respect of anything done by them
in pursuit of their objectives, up to the time of the signing of the...
Agreement."' 13 Although the rebels refused to comply with their
obligation to disarm, 14 and fighting continued through the May 2001
ceasefire, 15 the Sierra Leonean government has never renounced the

Sierra Leone); Elizabeth M. Evenson, Truth and Justice in Sierra Leone: Coordination
between Commission and Court, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 730, 733-37 (2004) (providing a
concise account of the conflict); Daniel J. Macaluso, Absolute and Free Pardon: The Effect
of the Amnesty Provision in the Lomi Peace Agreement on the Jurisdiction of the Special
Court for Sierra Leone, 27 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 347, 349-52 (2001-2002) (providing a
background account of the conflict as related to the Lom6 Accord); Babafemi Akinrinade,
International HumanitarianLaw and the Conflict in Sierra Leone, 15 NOTRE DAME J.L.
ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 391, 426-34 (2001) (providing a graphic account of soldiers' abuses
against civilians in Sierra Leone and addressing their culpability under international law).
8. See Macaluso, supra note 7, at 348; Physicians for Human Rights, War Related
Sexual Violence in Sierra Leone 21 (2002), available at http://www.phrusa.org/research/
sierrajleone/report.html [hereinafter Physicians for Human Rights Report] (providing a
background account of the Lomd Peace Accord).
9. Peace Agreement Between the Government of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary
United Front of Sierra Leone, July 7, 1999, Annex to Letter dated July 12, 1999 from the
Charge D'Affaires Ad Interim of the Permanent Mission of Togo to the United Nations
Addressed to the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/1999/777 (1999)
[hereinafter Lom6 Peace Accord]; see Maculuso, supra note 7, at 348 ("Both sides signed
the third, and most comprehensive, peace agreement, on July 7, 1999, in the Togolese capital
of Lomd.").
10. See Evenson, supra note 7, at 735, 737.
11. Id. at 737; Karen Gallagher, Note, No Justice, No Peace: The Legalities and
Realities of Amnesty in Sierra Leone, 23 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 149, 149-71 (2000)
(providing a detailed account of the terms of the amnesty provisions of the Lom6 Accord, as
well as the political background and response).
12. Lom6 Peace Accord, supra note 9, art. IX, § 3.
13. Id. art. IX, § 2. Article IX, § 1 of the Lom6 Peace Accord further secures an
absolute pardon and reprieve specifically for RUF leader Foday Sankoh, arguably the "worst
war criminal in the world." BERGNER, supra note 7, at 38 (noting the views of the human
rights community about Sankoh).
14. Macaluso, supra note 7, at 350-51.
15. Physicians for Human Rights Report, supra note 8, at 21 (noting isolated acts of
violence against civilians by both sides through July 2001).
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amnesty provision. 16
Despite acting as a "moral guarantor" to the agreement, 17 the
international community never accepted the amnesties, 18 and the
Special Court was established by a bilateral agreement between the
Government of Sierra Leone and the United Nations with temporal
jurisdiction over international crimes committed prior to the Lom6
Agreement. 19 Each of the active Special Court indictments charges
16. See Jones et. al, supra note 6, at 222 ("Whatever the United Nation's position in
1999 or later, the Government of Sierra Leone has never renounced the Lom6 amnesty. Nor
indeed has the government sought to prosecute any persons for acts within the amnesty's
time frame in its national courts."). Cf William A. Schabas, Amnesty, the Sierra Leone
Truth and Reconciliation Commission and the Special Court for Sierra Leone, I I U.C.
DAVIS J.INT'L L. & POL'Y 145, 153 (2004) (arguing that, in requesting the establishment of
the Special Court, "the Government of Sierra Leone 'reassessed' its position with respect to
amnesty" (quoting Solomon Berewa, Addressing Impunity Using Divergent Approaches:
The Truth and Reconciliation Commission and the Special Court, in TRUTH AND
RECONCILIATION INSIERRA LEONE 56 (2001))). In support of his proposition, Schabas cites
an address by Solomon Berewa, the Vice-President of Sierra Leone. See Berewa Solomon,
Addressing Impunity Using Divergent Approaches: The Truth and Reconciliation
Commission and the Special Court, available at http://www.sierra-leone.org/trcbooksolomonberewa.html. However, in this address, Vice-President Berewa states only that the
Government of Sierra Leone "reassessed [its] position" that "with peace at hand, the wounds
of the war would be healed through reconciliation. Id. In other words ...that truth was as
good as, or at least, an adequate substitute for justice." Id. The Vice-President did not
indicate that the Government of Sierra Leone "reassessed" the validity of the Lom6
Amnesties, and his address is clearly consistent with the view that individuals should be
punished for those actions committed subsequent to the signing of the Lom6 Peace Accord.
In fact, Vice-President Berewa explicitly notes that "[alnother aspect of the Lomd Peace
Agreement is that the amnesty granted by that Agreement was only in respect of violations
of Sierra Leone domestic law before the 7th July 1999, and not after that date." Id.
17. The United Nations signed the Lomd Peace Accord not as a party, but as a "moral
guarantor." See Schocken, supra note 2, at 441.
18. In signing the Lomd Peace Accord, the Special Representative of the U.N.
Secretary-General appended to his signature a handwritten disclaimer that amnesty
provisions of the agreement "shall not apply to international crimes of genocide, crimes
against humanity, war crimes and other serious violations of international law." The
Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-Generalon the Establishment of a Special Court
for Sierra Leone, delivered to the Security Council, 23, U.N. Doc. 2/2000/915 (Oct. 4,
2000) [hereinafter SG Report]. The reservation was later endorsed by the Security Council
in its Resolution 1315 (2000). S.C. Res. 1315, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1314 (Mar. 15, 2002). See
Shraga, supra note 3, at 31. This reservation was critical to the establishment of a Special
Court with temporal jurisdiction over pardoned crimes, and Article 10 of the Statute of the
Special Court explicitly invalidated any amnesties for international crimes falling within the
Court's jurisdiction. Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, art. 10 (Aug. 14, 2000)
[hereinafter Special Court Statute]; see also sched. to Special Court Ratification Act, supra
note 2 ("An amnesty granted to any person falling within the jurisdiction of the Special
Court in respect of crimes referred to in articles 2 to 4 of the present Statute shall not be a
bar to prosecution."); Nicole Fritz & Alison Smith, Current Apathy for Coming Anarchy:
Building the Special Court for Sierra Leone, 25 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 391, 424 (2001)
("Indeed, the Special Court is premised on [the] idea, namely that people are suspected of
having committed crimes under international law must be held accountable for their actions,
amnesty or no amnesty.").
19. Special Court Statute, supra note 18, art. 1, § 1 ("The Special Court shall, except as
provided in subparagraph (2), have the power to prosecute persons who bear the greatest
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defendants with the commission of crimes committed prior to July 7,
1999.20 Thus, if the amnesty provision of the Lomd Accord is valid,
it applies to every individual that has been indicted by the Special
Court.

While the Special Court has held that the Lom6 Accord is not
a valid legal instrument under international law, the validity of the
Accord under domestic law has not been impeached. The Special
Court considered the legality of the amnesty provisions in disposing
of a preliminary motion by two defendants, Morris Kallon and Brima
Bazzy Kamara, and determined that the Lom6 Agreement was not
valid under international law. 21 In so doing, however, the Court
stressed that
[w]hat rightly falls for consideration is not whether the
undertaking in the Lom6 Agreement made by the
responsibility for serious violations of international humanitarian law and Sierra Leonean
law committed in the territory of Sierra Leone since 30 November 1996, including those
leaders who, in committing such crimes, have threatened the establishment of and
implementation of the peace process in Sierra Leone."). By setting this start date for the
conflict, the Court deliberately affirmed its rejection of the amnesty provisions of the Lom6
Accord. See Alison Smith, Sierra Leone: The Intersection of Law, Policy, and Practice, in
INTERNATIONALIZED

CRIMINAL

COURTS:

SIERRA LEONE,

EAST

TIMOR,

KoSovO,

AND

CAMBODIA 125, 130 (Cesare P.R. Romano et al. eds., 2004) (arguing that March 1991, the

start of the conflict, and July 7, 1999 served as two more obvious dates for commencement,
and starting the temporal jurisdiction on the date of the failed Abidjan Agreement was an
unfortunate political compromise).
20. See Prosecutor v. Samuel Hinga Norman, Moiunina Fofana, Allieu Kondewa, Case
No. SCSL-04-14-T (June 15, 2005); Prosecutor v. Issa Hassan Sesay, Morris Kallon, and
Augustine Gbao, Case No. SCSL-2004-15-PT (Feb. 5, 2004); Prosecutor v. Alex Tamba
Brima et al., SCSL-2004-16-PT, Decision on Prosecution Request for Leave to Amend the
Indictment against Alex Tamba Brima, Brima Bazzy Kamara and Santigie Kanu (May 6,
2004); Prosecutor v. Charles Taylor, SCSL-2003-01-I, Decision on Immunity from
Jurisdiction (May 31, 2004).
21. Prosecutor v. Kallon, Case No. SCSL-2003-07-PT, Preliminary Motion based on
lack of Jurisdiction/Abuse of Process: Amnesty Provided by the Lom6 Accord (June 16,
2003); Prosecutor v. Kamara, Case No. SCLS-2003-10-PT, Application by Brima Bazzy
Kamara in respect to Jurisdiction and Defects in Indictment (June 16, 2003). The Special
Court declined to treat the Lom Agreement as an international instrument on the grounds
that:
(1) The role of the U.N. as a mediator of peace, the presence of a peacekeeping force which generally is by consent of the State and the mediation
efforts of the Secretary-General cannot add up to a source of obligation to the
international community to perform an agreement to which the U.N. is not a
party... (2) the U.N. assumed no legal obligations through its role as a moral
guarantor to the agreement, and (3) the RUF was a non-state party with no
legal personality under international law, and therefore (4) the agreement
created neither rights nor obligations that are capable of being regulated under
international law.
Prosecutor v. Kallon, Case No. SCSL-2004-15-AR, Decision to Challenge Jurisdiction:
Lom Accord Amnesty, V 36-42 (Mar. 13, 2004). In articulating this holding, the Special
Court offered no framework for evaluating the substantive legitimacy of the pardons under
international law, provided that they are agreed upon in valid international instrument, or
under domestic law.
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Government of Sierra Leone to grant amnesty is
binding on the Government of Sierra Leone, but
whether such undertaking could be effective in
depriving [the Special] Court of the jurisdiction
conferred on it by the treaty establishing it ....22
The amnesty provision's claim to legality under domestic law
was not impeached, and the validity of the amnesty provision as a
matter of Sierra Leonean law thus requires examination of the Sierra
Leonean Constitution.
B.

The Temporal Jurisdictionof the Court and the Sierra
Leonean Constitution: A Conflict of Laws

By endowing the Court with a temporal jurisdiction over
crimes committed prior to the Lom6 amnesties, the Special Court
Statute established an institution whose legal framework is
incompatible with the constitutional obligations of the Sierra
Leonean government. The National Constitution of Sierra Leone,
which was signed in 1991, holds that "the laws of Sierra Leone shall
comprise: (a) this Constitution; (b) laws made by or under the
authority of Parliament as established by this Constitution" and "(c)
any orders, rules, regulations and other statutory instruments made by
any person or authority pursuant to a power conferred in that behalf
by this Constitution or any other law." 23 Under this article, the
Special Court Statute, which was incorporated into Sierra Leonean
Law pursuant to the Special Court Ratification Act, 24 operates as
binding domestic law. So too, however, does the Lom6 Agreement,
which was signed by the President
pursuant to his authority under
25
Chapter 5 of the Constitution.
While the Special Court Statute and the Lom6 Agreement are
both binding, the Constitution delineates further obligations that
compel the Government to honor the amnesty provisions of the Lom6
Peace Agreement at the expense of inconsistent provisions within the
Special Court Statute. The Constitution establishes itself as a
22. Prosecutor v. Kallon, T 65.
23.

SIERRA LEONE CONST. ch. 12, §1.

24. Special Court Ratification Act, supra note 2, at "Memorandum and Reasons."
25.

SIERRA LEONE CONST. ch. 5, § 40, cl. 4(b) ("[T]he President shall . . . be

responsible ... for.. . the execution of treaties, agreements or conventions in the name of
Sierra Leone."). Sierra Leone's commitment to incorporate the Lom6 Accord into law is
further evinced by the portion of the Accord that calls upon the government to ensure that
the Constitution is consistent with the Accord and, if necessary, amend the former document
to reconcile it with the latter. Lom6 Peace Accord, supra note 9, art. 10 ("Review of the
Present Constitution").
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document that is legally superior to both domestic law and treaty, and
requires that any law that is inconsistent with one of its provisions be
voided. 26 The Constitution further mandates that "no person shall be
tried for a criminal offence if he shows that he has been pardoned for
that offence ..

"27

Therefore, since the Government has granted

"pardon and reprieve to all combatants and collaborators" under the
Lom6 Accord, the Constitution stipulates that these individuals
cannot legally be tried for "anything done by them in pursuit of their
objectives, up to the time of the signing of the present Agreement. 29
So long as the pardons remain in force, provisions of the Special
Court Statute are void under Sierra Leonean law to the extent that
they are inconsistent with the amnesty provisions of the Lom6 Peace
Accord. Thus, the trials of the Special Court prisoners are not legally
legitimate under the domestic law of Sierra Leone.
Some claim that the Special Court could reconcile this tension
by adopting a "dual approach" to its jurisdiction. 30 Under this
approach, the Lom6 amnesties would bar prosecution for common
crimes committed before 1999 but permit prosecution for common
crimes committed after 1999 or any international crimes. The
Special Court has arguably adopted such an approach. 3 1 Article 10
of the Special Court Statute provides that "[a]n amnesty granted to
any person falling within the jurisdiction of the Special Court in
26. SIERRA LEONE CONST. ch. 13, § 171, cl. 15 ("This Constitution shall be the
supreme law of Sierra Leone and any other law found to be inconsistent with any provision
of this Constitution shall, to the extent of the inconsistency, be void and of no effect.").
27. Id. ch. 3, § 23, cl.9. It should be noted that the provision affords an exception
allowing for the trial of individuals previously tried under military "service law" that applies
to a prior sentence in the provision protecting against double jeopardy. Id. It also states:
Provided that nothing in any law shall be held to be inconsistent with or in
contravention of this subsection by reason only that it authorises any court to
try a member of a defence force for a criminal offence notwithstanding any
trial and conviction or acquittal of that member under service law; but any
court so trying such a member and convicting him shall in sentencing him to
any punishment take into account any punishment awarded him under service
law.
Id. The qualification is not relevant to the matters that this Note addresses.
28. Lom6 Peace Accord, supra 9, art. 9, § 2.
29. Id. art. 9(2).
30. Shraga, supra note 3, at 31-32 (arguing that the Court adopted a "dual approach
to the question of amnesty and its validity depending on the nature of the crimes, the
time of their commission, and the jurisdiction before which they would be prosecutable.
Accordingly, amnesty would bar the prosecution of all crimes, whether national or
international, before the national courts of Sierra Leone; it would also bar the prosecution
before the Special Court of common crimes committed before 1999. Amnesty, however,
would not bar prosecution before the Special Court of international crimes committed at any
time within its temporal jurisdiction, and of common crimes committed after 1999").
31. See Fritz & Smith, supra note 18, at 391, 412 (contending that "the Statute
acknowledges that amnesties will be valid in respect of the included provisions of Sierra
Leone Law"); Macaluso, supra note 7, at 368.
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respect of the crimes referred to in articles 2 to 4 of the present
Statute shall not be a bar to prosecution." 3 2 This provision omits
Article 5 of the Statute, which incorporates provisions of Sierra
Leonean law. Consequently, amnesties
granted for domestic crimes
33
may provide a bar to prosecution.
However, no arguments have been offered that the dual
approach resolves the constitutional dilemma, and there is little
support for such a claim. Based on its text, the Sierra Leonean
Constitution does not explicitly distinguish between the
Government's obligation with respect to amnesties for international
crimes and amnesties for common crimes. There does not seem to be
any legislative history that would favor a reading outside the scope of
the text that would bar amnesties for international crimes. The
Constitution thus seems to prohibit the trial of any pardoned prisoner,
regardless of the nature of his or her crime.
It may be argued that the conflict of laws between the Sierra
Leonean Constitution and the Special Court Statute is illusory under
a broad interpretation of the Constitution. This interpretation would
hold that while the Government cannot try pardoned individuals,
non-State entities may do so. Written in the passive voice, the
amnesty provision of the Constitution stipulates that individuals shall
not be tried for pardoned offenses, without specifying who is
prohibited from trying them. 34
Read narrowly, the provision
indicates that any trial of a pardoned individual-by any courtwould be legally void in the eyes of the Sierra Leonean government.
However, an alternative interpretation suggests that pardoned
individuals may not be tried by courts established under the
Constitution, but that other courts-including the Special Courtcould have the legal imprimatur to convict and sentence them.
A defense of this broad construction may invoke canons of
statutory interpretation under English law, the system on which
Sierra Leone's jurisprudence is grounded. 35 At common law, there is
a presumption that the legislature intends to conform to general
principles of public international law as well as specific treaty
obligations: 3 6 "Every statute is to be so interpreted and applied, as
far as its language admits, as not to be inconsistent with the comity of
32.
33.

Special Court Statute, supra note 18, art. 10.
See Fritz & Smith, supra note 18, at 412 n.102.

34.

SIERRA LEONE CONST. ch. 3, § 23, cl. 9 ("no person shall be tried for a criminal

offence if he shows that he has been pardoned for that offence ....
35. For detailed support of this claim, see infra Part II.C.
36. See FRANCIS BENNION, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: A CODE 942 (Butterworths
4th ed. 2002); JIM EVANS, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: PROBLEMS OF COMMUNICATION 303

(Oxford University Press 1988).
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nations or with established principles of international law." 37 This
principle thus lends weight to the broad construction of the pardon
provision in the Sierra Leone Constitution so that the domestic law
conforms to the State's international commitment to honor the
temporal jurisdiction of the Special Court.
However, other core principles of statutory interpretation
weigh against this construction in favor of an interpretation that
better secures the rights of the pardoned individual. An equipollent
canon of statutory construction at English common law holds that
"the legislature does not intend to limit vested rights further than
clearly appears from the enactment. ' 38 The protection that the Sierra
Leonean Constitution accords to those who receive amnesties is
clearly a right that is vested in particular individuals. In cases where
such a right is vested and there is external evidence that the
legislature intended a narrower interpretation than can be understood
from the text, "who is to have the benefit of those doubts, Parliament,
or the holder of the right? The orthodox answer is 'the holder of the
right' . . . ."9 On this view, it would be plainly inappropriate to

impute a rights-restricting interpretation to a text that, on its face,
seems to afford broad freedom from trial for those who have received
a pardon.
Even under the rights-restricting construction of the
constitutional provision, however, the Government of Sierra Leone is
prohibited from involving itself with the imprisonment of pardoned
individuals who are convicted in an alternative court.
The
Constitution mandates that "no person shall be deprived of his
personal liberty except as may be authorized by law" under a discrete
set of circumstances, including "in the execution of a sentence or
order of a Court whether in Sierra Leone or elsewhere in respect of a
criminal offence of which he has been convicted. '40 In order for this
provision to be read as a coherent, rights-conferring constitutional
guarantee, the conviction that serves as the basis for the sentence
must satisfy a threshold of legitimacy. In the case of those
individuals pardoned under the Lom6 Accord, the trial that serves as
the basis for their sentence would fail to satisfy a basic constitutional
requirement that "no person shall be tried for a criminal offence if he
shows that he has been pardoned for that offence .. .. "41 If this
37. BENNION, supra note 36, at 942 (quoting Sir James Hannen P's dicta in Bloxam v.
Favre (1883) 8 P.D. 101,104 (U.K.)).
38. SIR RUPERT CROSS, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 177 (Butterworths 3rd ed. John
Bell & Sir George Engle, 1995).
39. CROSS, supra note 38, at 178.
40.

SIERRA LEONE CONST. ch. 3, § 17, cl. 1.

41.

Id. ch. 3, § 22, cl. 9.
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threshold did not need to be satisfied, the Government could
circumvent its basic constitutional obligations toward its prisoners by
delegating its judicial authority to another body, thus stripping the
provision of any protective force and rendering it pointless. A
fundamental canon of statutory construction at common law
establishes the presumption that, in creating a statute, the legislature
does not intend a result that is "futile or pointless." 42
A
constitutional reading that would allow the Government of Sierra
Leone to imprison individuals on the basis of trials that would be
fundamentally illegitimate if they were carried out by Sierra Leonean
courts is therefore implausible. Thus, even under a rights-restricting
interpretation of the Sierra Leone Constitution, the Government may
not play a role in depriving an amnestied individual of his or her
liberty.
C.

Incarcerationof PrisonersConvicted by the Special Court

Despite the constitutional problems highlighted above, the
Special Court Statute entrusts prisoners convicted by the Court to the
domestic law of Sierra Leone and vests the host government with
primary custody over them, barring exceptional circumstances, and
thus entitles them to the protections of the Sierra Leonean
Constitution. Since no individuals have been convicted by the
Special Court as of September 2005, 4 3 the determination of who
bears responsibility for incarcerating convicted prisoners is
necessarily an exercise in statutory interpretation. 44 Article 22(1) of
the Special Court Statute holds that "imprisonment shall be served in
Sierra Leone." 45 The clause goes on to allow that
If circumstances so require, imprisonment may also be
served in any of the States which have concluded with
the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda or the
42.

BENNION, supra note 36, at 831.

43. The trials for indicted individuals are still in process. See The Special Court for
Sierra Leone, http://www.sc-sl.org.
44.

Article 31 of the Vienna Convention provides the framework for this interpretation.

The Special Court was officially established by a bilateral agreement between the
Government of Sierra Leone and the United Nations. Special Court Agreement, supra note
2. This agreement constitutes a treaty under Article 2, § l(a)(i) of the Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties Between States and International Organizations or Between
International Organizations (Mar. 21, 1986). Official Records of the U.N. Conference on the
Law of Treaties between States and International Organizations or Between International
Organizations, vol. II, U.N. Sales No. E.94.V.5 [hereinafter Vienna Convention]. Article 31
of the Convention maintains that "[a] treaty shall be interpreted in good faith.., in the light
of its object and purpose." Id. art. 31.
45. Special Court Statute, supra note 18, art. 22, § 1 (emphasis added).
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International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia an agreement for the enforcement of
sentences, and which have indicated to the Registrar
of the Special Court their willingness to accept
convicted persons. . . . The Special Court may
conclude similar agreements
for the enforcement of
46
sentences with other States.
On their face, these two clauses of the section are
contradictory. The first clause, employing the term "shall," seems to
mandate that sentences be served within the territory of Sierra Leone.
The second allows that sentences "may" be served in alternative
States. Clarification of
this apparent inconsistency requires recourse
47
to the drafting history.
Based on this history, the reading that renders these two
clauses most consistent is one wherein Sierra Leone occupies a
position of supremacy over other States in terms of its right and
obligation to hold Special Court prisoners. The official United
Nations (UN) document concerning the establishment of the Court,
the "Report of the Secretary-General on the Establishment of a
Special Court for Sierra Leone," stipulates that "imprisonment shall
normally be served in Sierra Leone," but then considers conditions
under which such an arrangement would be undesirable. 4 8 In this
account of the textually inconsistent clauses, Sierra Leone is the
statutorily preferred location for prisoners, barring exigent
circumstances.
The two circumstances that the international community
seemed to contemplate in establishing the alternative location
provision were security and the rights of the prisoners. Security
concerns seem to be the principal reason for establishing the clause.
After stressing that imprisonment shall normally be served in Sierra
Leone, the Secretary-General cautions that "particular circumstances,
such as the security risk entailed in the continued imprisonment of
some of the convicted persons on Sierra Leonean territory, may
require their relocation to a third state." 49 Such a concern was well-

46. Id.
47. In determining the meaning of ambiguous terms in view of a treaty's object and
purpose, it is appropriate under the Vienna Convention to take recourse to documents
produced by one of the parties and recognized by the other through the course of the drafting
history: "The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall, comprise, in
addition to its text. .. any instrument which was made by one or more parties in connection
with the conclusion of the treaty and accepted by the other parties as an instrument of that
treaty." Vienna Convention, supra note 44, art. 31, § 2(b).
48. SG Report, supranote 18, para. 49.
49. Id.
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founded, as the occupants of the central prison in Freetown, the
50
Pademba Road prison, had been freed during two previous coups.
The second, rights-based concern stems from the condition of
Sierra Leonean prisons. International instruments establish minimum
international prison standards. 51 Concerns have been expressed that
none of the prisons in Sierra Leone currently meet these minimum
standards. 52 This concern was apparent at the time of the Statute's
implementation, when a UN team concluded that the Sierra Leonean
53
prisons "were found to be inadequate in their current state."
However, if the security and integrity of the domestic prisons
improve, the Special Court is under a statutory mandate to
incarcerate its convicts in Sierra Leone, and the prisoners will benefit
from the protections of the Sierra Leonean Constitution. The Special
Court Statute states that "[c]onditions of imprisonment, whether in
Sierra Leone or in a third State, shall be governed by the law of the
State of enforcement subject to the supervision of the Special
Court."54 In other words, the Special Court Statute seems to
50. Sierra Leone Coup Leaders Seal Country's Borders, THE GUARDIAN (LONDON),
May 30, 1997, at 16 ("Major Koromah, aged 33, was among those freed from Pademba
Road prison in Freetown early on Sunday, as the coup started."); More Light Shed on Sierra
Leone's New Leader, THE XINHUA NEWS AGENCY, May 26, 1997 ("koroma [sic] was freed
from the pademba road prison [sic] in freetown [sic] on early sunday [sic] by the coupists,
together with hundreds of inmates in the prison."); Sierra Leone: Ecomog Commander
Deplores End of US Aid for his Force, BBC MONITORING AFRICA (citing SIERRA LEONE

NEWS Website in English (Jan. 13, 1999)), Jan. 15, 1999 ("The warning followed reports that
prisoners, including soldiers loyal to the former junta, who were freed from Pademba Road
Prison, had been trying to leave Freetown by boat.").
51. The United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners,
adopted Aug. 30, 1955 by the First U.N. Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the
Treatment of Offenders, U.N. Doc. A/CONF/6/1, annex I, A (1956), approved July 31,
1957, E.S.C. Res. 663(c), 24 U.N. ESCOR Supp. (No. 1) at 11, U.N. Doc. E/3048 (1957),
amended May 13, 1977, E.S.C. Res. 2076, 62 U.N. ESCOR Supp. (No. 1) at 35, U.N. Doc.
E/5988 (1977); the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for Non-Custodial Measures,
G.A. Res. 45/110, U.N. Doc. A/RES/45/110 (Dec. 14, 1990); Body of Principles for the
Protection of All Persons under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment, G.A. Res. 43/173,
U.N. Doc. A/RES/43/173 (Dec. 9, 1988); G.A. Res. 40/146, U.N. Doc. A/RES/40/146 (Dec.
13, 1985); G.A. Res. 40/32, U.N. Doc. A/RES/40/32 (Nov. 29, 1985); the United Nations
Rules for the Protection of Juveniles Deprived of their Liberty, G.A. Res. 45/113, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/45/113 (Dec. 14, 1990); the Intemational Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Jan. 3, 1976); the International Labour
Organization (I.L.O.) Fundamental Conventions on Forced Labor, comprised of the
Convention Concerning Forced or Compulsory Labor, I.L.O. Conv. No. 29, 39 U.N.T.S. 55
(adopted on June 28, 1930, entered into force May 1, 1932); Forced Labour (Indirect
Compulsion) Recommendation, 1930 (No. 35); and Convention Concerning Abolition of
Forced Labour, I.L.O. Conv. No. 105, 320 U.N.T.S. 291 (entered into force Jan. 17, 1959);
the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77, 596 U.N.T.S.
261; and the Council of Europe Convention on the Transfer of Sentenced Persons, Mar. 21,
1983, 35 U.S.T. 2867, 22 I.L.M. 530.
52. E-mail Interview with Peter Andersen, supra note 6.
53. SG Report, supra note 18, para. 62.
54. Special Court Statute, supra note 18, art. 22, § 2.
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incorporate domestic law with respect to the confinement of
prisoners. Consequently, courts would be bound to apply Sierra
Leonean law-including its constitutional protections against
imprisonment for a pardoned crime-in disposing of cases brought
by prisoners convicted by the Special Court.
In addition to incorporating domestic law with respect to the
incarceration of convicts, the Special Court Statute seems to vest the
host government with actual control over the prisoners. The Special
Court Ratification Act implies that the Sierra Leone Director of
Prisons is entrusted with substantial authority over Special Court
prisoners: The Act indicates that the Director of Prisons must allow
the Special Court to supervise the incarceration of prisoners,
requiring that the Director allow communication between the Court
and the prisoner, provide information to the Court upon request, and
ensure access to the prisoner by Court judges. 55 Thus, the
Government of Sierra Leone, through the service of the Director of
Prisons, would play a significant role in the incarceration of Special
Court prisoners.
D.

The Writ of Habeas Corpus in Sierra Leonean Law

1.

The Existence of the Writ under Sierra Leonean Law

A substantive analysis of the writ of habeas corpus in Sierra
Leone is a complicated and formalistic endeavor. Unlike in most
common law regimes, the existence and substance of the writ in
Sierra Leone cannot be clarified by recourse to case law. Publication
of Sierra Leone court decisions ceased in the 1970s, 56 and the
unpublished cases were largely destroyed by fire in the attacks on
Freetown. 57 The country's unwritten law has thus remained in stasis
and, in many respects, "Sierra'58Leone's legal development appears
rather placid, if not somnolent.
However, while the legal status of the writ seems unclear at
first blush, it becomes apparent upon careful analysis of the Sierra
Leonean Constitution and common law.
Section 125 of the
Constitution stipulates that "[t]he Supreme Court . . . shall have

power to issue such directions, orders or writs including writs of
habeas corpus.., as it may consider appropriate for the purposes of
55. Special Court Ratification Act, supra note 2, art. 34, § 2 (emphasis added).
56. Smith, supra note 19, at 135.
57. Id. at 135 n.33.
58. Foreign
Law
Database
on
Sierra
Leone,
Introductory
Abstract,
http://www.foreignlawguide.com (last visited Feb. 15, 2006).
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59
enforcing or securing the enforcement of its supervisory powers."
The Constitution goes on to maintain that
[t]he High Court of Justice . . . in the exercise of its

supervisory jurisdiction shall have power to issue such
directions, writs and orders, including writs of habeas
corpus . . . as it may consider appropriate for the
purposes of enforcing or
securing the enforcement of
60
its supervisory powers.

The common law of Sierra Leone makes clear that the power of
judges to issue the writ confers an absolute right to the writ for those
being deprived of liberty in Sierra Leone.
The common law of Sierra Leone prior to the nation's
independence mirrors English common law. The Sierra Leone
Courts Act of 1965 explicitly incorporated English law, with the date
of reception fixed at January 1, 1890.61 The Constitution of Sierra
Leone recognizes the validity of this common law, 62 and the current
common law of Sierra Leone is thought to closely parallel that of
English common law prior to 1960.63 Since Sierra Leone has made
no effort to alter the writ of habeas corpus by statute, 64 non-published
and now undocumented cases presumably cannot serve as
59. SIERRA LEONE CONST. ch. 7, § 125.
60. Id. ch. 7, § 134.
61. Foreign Law Database on Sierra Leone, supra note 58.
62. SIERRA LEONE CONST. ch. 12, § 170, cl. 1. ("The law of Sierra Leone shall
comprise ... the common law."). The Constitution defines this common law as "the rules of
law generally known as the common law, the rules of law generally known as the doctrines
of equity, and the rules of customary law including those determined by the Superior Court
of Judicature." Id. ch. 12, § 170, cl. 2. Further ensuring the validity of the English common
law system at least until 1890, the Constitution stipulates that "the existing law shall, save as
otherwise provided in subsection (1), comprise the written and unwritten laws of Sierra
Leone as they existed immediately before the date of the coming into force of this
Constitution." Id. ch. 12, § 170, cl. 4.
63. Foreign Law Database on Sierra Leone, supra note 58.
64. The Constitution mandates that any statutes that the legislature implements must be
published in order to achieve force of law. Indeed, it states:
Every statutory instrument shall be published in the Gazette not later than
twenty-eight days after it is made or, in the case of a statutory instrument which
will not have the force of law unless it is approved by some person or authority
other than the person or authority by which is it made, not later than twentyeight days after it is approved, and if it is not so published it shall be void from
the date on which it was made.
SIERRA LEONE CONST. ch. 12, § 170, cl. 6.
There are no published provisions in acts reasonably relating to substantive and procedural
criminal law that would alter the common law right to the writ of habeas corpus; i.e., there
are no modifications to the common law writ of habeas corpus in the following pieces of
legislation: The Human Rights Commission of Sierra Leone Act (2004); The Special Court
Agreement, (Ratification) Act (2002); The National Security and Central Intelligence Act
(2002); The Truth and Reconciliation Act (2000); The Criminal Procedures Act (1965);
Prevention of Cruelty to Children (1926).
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precedential authority in a common-law system. 65 Therefore, it may
be presumed both that the writ exists under contemporary Sierra
Leonean common law and that English habeas corpus law prior to
1960 may provide a reasonably
accurate proxy for current Sierra
66
Leonean law on the subject.
Since Sierra Leone has adopted basic elements of English
common law, the discretion that the Constitution confers upon judges
to grant the writ evinces the existence of a right to the writ. At
common law, "[i]f evidence discloses a prima facie case that [a]
detention is unlawful, a court is under a duty to issue the writ," 67 and
"[the [Habeas] Act of 1679 imposes the severest penalties on all
68
persons (includingjudges) who fail to do their duty in the process."
Thus, so long as a judge has the power to issue a writ of habeas
corpus, the judge has a duty to do so if a prisoner whose containment
is unlawful brings a petition before him. 69 It follows that a
constitutional provision according Sierra Leonean judges the power
to issue writs of habeas corpus necessarily endows them with a duty
to issue the writ.
2.

The Substance of the Writ in Sierra Leonean Law

The principle underlying the issue of the writ of habeas
corpus in English common law-and thus in Sierra Leonean law"cannot be better expressed than in the words of Blackstone: 'The
King... is at all times entitled to have an account, why the liberty of
65. This Note assumes that no radical changes in habeas corpus jurisprudence occurred
in Sierra Leone between the years of 1960 and 1970, during which time cases may have
been published, but are not available.
66. Whether Sierra Leonean law on the writ reflects the English common law as of
1890, the point at which the law of England is incorporated by statute, or English common
law as of 1960, the year of independence, is of little import. The last limited change to the
writ in England occurred upon the enactment of the Administration of Justice Act of 1960.
BADSHAH K. MIAN, ENGLISH HABEAS CORPUS: LAW, HISTORY, POLITICS 129 (1984). Sierra
Leone had already adopted English common law at this point. However, notwithstanding
this change, habeas corpus is a writ that has "been little altered since ancient times." PHILLIP
S. JAMES, INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LAW 174 (Butterworths 4th ed. 1959) (The fourth
edition is selected for being closest to the time at which Sierra Leone incorporated English
law; the same claim is also made in later editions).
67. TERRENCE INGMAN, THE ENGLISH LEGAL PROCESS 168 (Oxford University Press 9th
ed. 2002).
68. EDWARDS JENKS, THE BOOK OF ENGLISH LAW 139 (John Murray (Publishers) Ltd.
5th ed. 1953) (emphasis added). The author of this Note selected this edition for being the
one published closest to the date at which the English common law was adopted by Sierra
Leone.
69. As further support for this claim of right under common law, consider that the writ
of habeas corpus is the only writ addressed under the chapter entitled "Rights of the
Subject," in Edwards Jenk's book. See id. at 138.
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his subjects is restrained."' 70 The remedy is available as of right,7 1
provided that probable cause is demonstrated before a court. 72 Once
the writ is issued, it "will be served upon the person having custody
of the person detained,"7 3 who may be bound to release the prisoner.
The custodian on whom the court serves the writ is compelled to
"appear before the Court or judge to show legal cause for the
detention: if he cannot do this the person detained will at once be
freed." 74 "Since every detention is prima
facie unlawful the burden
75
of proof is on the detainer to justify it."
The respondent's duties under the writ have led commentators
to conclude that the individual must be "a person having the capacity
to exert control over the subject of the precept." 76 The writ,
according to Blackstone, "commands the jailer to bring the applicant
before the court on the day and at the time specified 'together with
the day and cause of his being taken and detained .... ""'
Because
the respondent must both bring the prisoner before the court and be
able to physically effect the prisoner's release, it follows that the writ
must be brought against the acting custodian of the detainee.
In Sierra Leone, the Government's Director of Prisons
satisfies the role of acting custodian over state prisoners, and would
thus be a proper respondent to a habeas petition. The Director of
78
Prisons serves as the head of prison administration for the country,
thus conferring on him sufficient authority to exert control over the
prisoner bringing the writ. The propriety of bringing petitions
against the Director of Prisons is supported by the Special Court
petition brought by Alex Tamba Brima, 9 wherein he cited the Sierra
Leone Director of Prisons as a respondent in a petition that was
intended to conform to Sierra Leonean domestic law on the writ of
habeas corpus. 80 The right to habeas corpus, thus concretized into
70. JAMES, supra note 66, at 173 (quoting Blackstone).
71. INGMAN, supra note 67, at 168.
72. MIAN, supra note 66, at 78.
73. JAMES, supra note 66, at 173.
74. Id. at 173-74.
75. INGMAN, supra note 67, at 168.
76. WILLIAM F. DUKER, A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF HABEAS CORPUS 13 (1980).
77. Lord Justice Simon Brown, Administrative Law Bar Association, Annual Lecture:
Habeas Corpus-A New Chapter (Nov. 23, 1999) available at http://www.adminlaw.org.uk/
publications/habeas-corpus.htm (quoting WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES).
78. Commonwealth
Human
Rights
Initiative
website,
http://www.
humanrightsinitiative.org/programs/aj/prisons/statistics/contacts.htm (last visited Nov. 4,
2005) (listing the heads of prisons for numerous states, including Sierra Leone).
79. Brima, Trial Court Habeas Petition, supra note 6, at 1.
80. Brima argued that his habeas right existed by virtue of the Special Court for Sierra
Leone forming part of the Sierra Leonean court system, and thus falling under the
supervisory jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of the Republic of Sierra Leone. Id. at 5. The
defendant reasoned that he would consequently be entitled to bring habeas petitions under
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Sierra Leonean law, would provide Special Court prisoners who are
incarcerated in Sierra Leone with recourse to contest the lawfulness
of their detentions, thereby creating the pressing problem described
in Part H1.
II.

THE "HABEAS PROBLEM" AND UNILATERAL SOLUTIONS

The unique contingencies of the Sierra Leonean legal system
are such that a clash of its jurisdictional laws with those of the
Special Court could devastate the Court's core purpose. Specifically,
due to the habeas corpus right accorded to prisoners by the Sierra
Leonean Constitution, the conflict between the temporal jurisdiction
of the Special Court and the amnesty provision of the Lomd Accord
81
could mandate the release of prisoners detained in Sierra Leone.
This problem could be solved by unilateral measures that
circumscribe the power of the domestic courts of Sierra Leone to
secure the protections granted under the Constitution.
This Part identifies the habeas problem and considers
unilateral solutions that the Special Court could adopt to address it.
Section A explains how the imprisonment of Special Court prisoners
in Sierra Leonean prisons could result in their release. Section B
addresses the threshold consideration of whether the habeas problem
merits a solution. Section C introduces intuitively attractive solutions
to the habeas problem that the Special Court could unilaterally adopt,
resulting in the diminished authority of the domestic courts of Sierra
Leone.

Section 125 of the Sierra Leonean Constitution. Id. Thus, Brima presumably crafted his
petition to conform to the common law of Sierra Leone.
81. This Note describes a problem arising subsequent to conviction. Whether a habeas
problem is posed by the detention of Court defendants prior to conviction depends on
whether one adopts a narrow or broad construction of the Sierra Leonean Constitution. Prior
to conviction, detainees are "delivered forthwith into the custody of the Special Court" upon
arrest. Special Court Ratification Act, supra note 2, art. 25. These defendants are then kept
within a detention center in the Court's complex. E-mail Interview with Peter Andersen,
supra note 6. Therefore, unlike convicted prisoners, these individuals are not being deprived
of liberty by the Government of Sierra Leone. Under a narrow reading of the Sierra
Leonean Constitution, the trials for which these individuals are being detained are void.
These detainees would be lawfully entitled to release if they brought a petition to domestic
courts, as the writ of habeas corpus may be directed against non-State actors. See JAMES,
supra note 66, at 174. Under a broad reading, however, their trial is valid and their detention
is permissible, so long as it is not undertaken by the Government of Sierra Leone. A
resolution of this issue is beyond the scope of this Note.
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The Habeas Problem

The habeas problem follows simply from the legal tensions
addressed in Part I. Consider a case in which the Special Court
convicts a defendant who received amnesty under the Lom6 Accord
and, pursuant to Article 22 of the Special Court Statute, orders him to
serve his sentence in Sierra Leone. This prisoner will be subject to
Sierra Leonean law. The Special Court Statute maintains that
"[c]onditions of imprisonment, whether in Sierra Leone or in a third
State, shall be governed by the law of the State of enforcement
subject to the supervision of the Special Court." 82 This clause
ensures that the prisoner will enjoy those legal protections afforded
by domestic law, including the writ of habeas corpus.
The prisoner's captor will likewise be subject to Sierra
Leonean law. The Special Court Ratification Act indicates that the
Sierra Leone Director of Prisons is charged with primary custody
over prisoners. 83 The Act indicates that the Director of Prisons must
allow the Special Court to supervise the incarceration of the
prisoners, requiring that the Director allow communication between
the Court and the prisoner, provide information to the Court upon
request, and ensure access to the prisoner by Court judges. 84 The
qualification that this information will only be provided upon request
indicates that, while the Special Court may have some formal
authority over the prisoner, it would not be responsible for the dayto-day control of the prisoner's custody. Moreover, limitations on
the Director of Prison's authority are only sensible if the Director has
both a custodial responsibility over the prisoner and sufficient
discretion over the prisoner's care that explicit exceptions to his
actual authority must be stated. Thus, the Director of Prisons
presumably has the power to bring the prisoner before the court and
physically affect the prisoner's release, and is thus the proper
respondent to a habeas petition under Sierra Leonean law. The
prisoner would therefore enjoy a right to petition the 85
domestic courts
to issue a writ of habeas corpus against his custodian.
Once the court issues a writ, 86 the custodian would be unable
to demonstrate the legality of the prisoner's detention under Sierra
82. Special Court Statute, supra note 18, art. 22, § 2.
83. See supra Part III.D.2.
84. Special Court Ratification Act, supra note 2, art. 34, § 2 (emphasis added).
85. See INGMAN, supra note 67, at 168 (stating that the habeas corpus remedy is
available as a matter of right, provided that the prisoner presents a primafacie case that his
detention is illegal).
86. Assuming that the prisoner makes a prima facie case for the illegality of his
detention.
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Leonean law. The Government of Sierra Leone is bound by
87
international agreement to honor the authority of the Special Court.
However, this obligation is qualified by the existence of the
Constitution as "the supreme law of the land" requiring that "any
other law found to be inconsistent with any provision of th[e]
Constitution shall, to the extent of the inconsistency, be void and of
no effect." 88 While the Special Court may be under an unmitigated
duty to apply the law of the Statute, domestic courts are subject to a
separate hierarchy of legal obligations.
Under these obligations, the domestic courts are prohibited
from recognizing the validity of the Special Court trial insofar as it
serves as the basis of detention by the Sierra Leonean government.
The Constitution holds that "no person shall be tried for a criminal
89
offence if he shows that he has been pardoned for that offence."
The Constitution further stipulates that "no person shall be deprived
of his personal liberty except as may be authorised by law" except
under a discrete set of circumstances, including "in the execution of a
sentence or order of a Court whether in Sierra Leone or elsewhere in
respect of a criminal offence of which he has been convicted." 90
Thus, the Special Court trial that served as the basis for the prisoner's
incarceration would not be recognized under domestic law.
Consequently the Director of Prisons would have no constitutional
ground for detaining the prisoner. The domestic courts would be
compelled to order the prisoner's release.
Though the release of the prisoner without the consent of the
Special Court is prohibited by the Special Court Statute, this
consideration is trumped by the domestic courts' constitutional
obligations. Under the Special Court Statute, "[t]here shall only be
pardon or commutation of sentence if the President of the Special
Court, in consultation with the judges, so decides on the basis of the
interests of justice and the general principles of law." 91 However, the
incorporation of the common law writ of habeas corpus into the
Sierra Leonean Constitution renders this law void under the hierarchy
of law by which domestic judges are bound. 92 Since one element of
the writ is the obligatory release of an individual held illegally, the
court would be forced to release the prisoner in spite of the
Government's duties under Article 23 of the Statute.

87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

Special Court Ratification Act, supra note 2.
SIERRA LEONE CONST. ch. 13, § 171, cl. 15.
Id. ch. 3, § 23, cl. 9.
Id. ch. 3, § 17, cl. I(b).
Special Court Statute, supra note 18, art. 23.

92.

See SIERRA LEONE CONST. ch. 13, § 171, cl. 15.
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An objection to this analysis could be offered on the grounds
that Special Court prisoners are ultimately incarcerated under the
authority of the Court, which would not be bound to respond to a
habeas petition.
The Special Court Statute indicates that
imprisonment, while governed by the law of the State of
93
enforcement, is "subject to the supervision of the Special Court."

Since the Court does not view itself as owing its existence to the
Constitution of Sierra Leone, and "application of the Constitution
was limited to Courts created by that Constitution,"
it would not be
94
bound by Sierra Leonean constitutional principles
However, this contention is flawed for two reasons. First, the
text of the Special Court Statute does not confer immunity upon the
Court from the laws of the host state. The statute maintains that the
imprisonment of prisoners "shall be governed by the law of the State
of enforcement subject to the supervision of the Special Court." 95
The authority conferred upon the Court by the second clause of this
phrase, "subject to the supervision," suggests that the supervisor must
honor the laws of the state of enforcement. While the Court may not
be subject to the Sierra Leonean Constitution when acting qua
adjudicator, it explicitly incorporates domestic law into its sentencing
provisions, and would thus be bound by it qua jailor. Since the
Special Court implicates the Government of Sierra Leone in the
imprisonment of Court convicts-albeit at a subordinate level-the
conditions of the prisoner's detainment would be illegal even if one
recognized the legal primacy of the Special Court Statute.
Second, the terms of the Special Court's supervision as
contemplated in the Special Court Ratification Agreement are
limited. Specifically, the Agreement requires that the Director of
Prisons allow communication between the Court and the prisoner,
provide information to the Court upon request, and ensure access to
the prisoner by Court judges. 96 While the Agreement cautions that
these limitations should not be read to "prevent the Director of
Prisons from complying with any other request of the Special Court
in relation to the supervision of sentences," 97 they nonetheless
suggest a rather modest supervisory capacity in comparison to the
practical authority of the Director of Prisons.

93. Special Court Statute, supra note 18, art. 22, § 2.
94. Kleffner & Nollkaemper, supra note 6, at 16 (citing the Court's view of the source
of its legal authority as expressed in the Trial Court opinion of the habeas ruling in Brima,
Trial Court Habeas Petition, supra note 6).
95. Special Court Statute, supra note 18, art. 22, § 2.
96. Special Court Ratification Act, supra note 2, art. 34, § 2.
97. Id. art. 34, § 3.
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The sentencing mechanisms in the Special Court Statute
require cooperation between the Court and the State in achieving
shared goals. However, these mechanisms are deeply problematic
given the conflict of laws between these entities with regard to
amnesty. So long as prisoners are sentenced for crimes that the
Sierra Leonean Constitution does not recognize as punishable, the
State is obliged to allow their release.
B.

Does the HabeasProblem Merit a Solution?

The habeas problem would result in the release of individuals
convicted for shocking atrocities, 98 and thus compels a speedy
remedy. However, there exists a counterintuitive argument that
Sierra Leone's responsibility to honor amnesties trumps
countervailing considerations. "In the absence of a decisive victory,
a formal amnesty is likely to be a necessary first step in the process
of consolidating peace, the rule of law, and democracy." 99 In the
case of the Lom6 Accord, civil society participants in the peace
process seemed to regard the amnesties as an unfortunate
necessity. 100 Since the Government of Sierra Leone has never
officially renounced the amnesty provisions, 10 1 any steps to
undermine them may give pause.
Critics argue that the prospective costs of violating an
amnesty outweigh the benefits of punishing those charged by the
Special Court.10 2 On this view, the violation of the amnesties creates
10 3 If
disincentives for future parties to engage in peace brokering.
the present amnesties are violated, there would be little reason for
future parties to believe that amnesties will be honored. Thus, if
amnesties have been accorded, they should be upheld regardless of
the international compulsion to prosecute perpetrators.
However, the political realities of the Lom6 Accord amnesties
grossly undermine the merits of this argument. Instead of being
viewed as an instrument for peace, the RUF saw the Lom6 Accord
98. For a disturbing account of some of the atrocities committed during the conflict in
Sierra Leone, see BERGNER, supra note 7. For an empirical account of the breadth of the
atrocities, see Physicians for Human Rights Report, supra note 8.
99. Jack Snyder & Leslie Vinjamuri, Trials and Errors: Principle and Pragmatismin
StrategiesofInternationalJustice, 28 INT'L SECURITY 5, 18 (2003).

100. Gallagher, supra note 11, at 190.
101. See Jones et al., supra note 6, at 222.
102. See Schocken, supra note 2, at 451-52 (arguing that "amnesties should be made
deliberately, after weighing the wishes of the victims against the possibilities of creating a
lasting peace, and amnesty decisions, once made, should be final").
103.

See id. at 451-52.
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"as a step toward entrenching their practices of domination and
plunder."04 Despite some guarded support by the public, 10 5 many
within Sierra Leone were outraged at the granting of an amnesty that
seemed to reward the rebels. 106 Thus, the amnesties did little to
ensure peace as the rebels refused to comply with the Accord and
continued to commit atrocities. 10 7 Such an ill-conceived amnesty is
not one that the international community would be well-served to
replicate, so the disincentives that violating the amnesty would create
for rebels like the RUF to participate in future peace negotiations are
not a pressing concern. The precedent that abandoning the amnesties
would create thus fails to offer a compelling reason against resolving
the habeas problem.
The argument for amnesties is further outweighed by the
international community's legal and political duty to punish those
who bear the greatest responsibility for conflict in Sierra Leone. The
amnesty provisions of the Lomd Accord arguably frustrate Sierra
10 8
Leone's duty under international law to punish war criminals.
Because trials "secure preeminent rights and values," 10 9 international
law imposes a general duty upon States to prosecute for atrocious
crimes, and governments cannot extinguish their international
obligations "merely to appease disaffected military forces or to
promote national reconciliation" by granting amnesties. 110
In
addition to this general duty to prosecute under international law, the
Government of Sierra Leone has assumed international obligations in
signing the Special Court Agreement that cannot be invalidated by a
conflict with its internal law.1 ' Thus, while the domestic courts of
104. Snyder & Vinjamuri, supra note 99, at 35.
105. See Gallagher, supra note 11, at 190.
106. Akinrinade, supra note 7, at 438-39.
107. Macaluso, supra note 7, at 350-51.
108. While a comprehensive analysis of this point is beyond the scope of this Note, see
Akinrinade, supra note 7, at 438-39 (citing the view of some human rights groups towards
the amnesty provisions of the Lom6 Accords). For a detailed case for the general duty under
customary international law to prosecute crimes of war, see Diane Orentlicher, Settling
Accounts: The Duty to Prosecute Human Rights Violations of a PriorRegime, 100 YALE
L.J. 2539 (1991) (arguing that international law imposes a duty prosecute for human rights
abuses including torture, extra-legal killings, and forced disappearances, and that amnesties
cannot cover atrocious crimes). But see Gallagher, supra note 11, at 174-86 (arguing that
the Lom6 amnesties do not violate any duty under international law to prosecute atrocities).
109. See Orentlicher, supra note 108, at 2549.
110. See id. at 2595-96.
11. The Special Court was established according to a bilateral agreement governed by
the Vienna Convention. Under the Vienna Convention, "[a] State party to a treaty may not
invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure to perform the treaty,"
supra note 44, art. 27(1), and "[a] State may not invoke the fact that its consent to be bound
by a treaty has been expressed in violation of a provision of its internal law regarding
competence to conclude treaties as invalidating its consent unless that violation was manifest
and concerned a rule of its internal law of fundamental importance." Id. art. 46(1). A
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Sierra Leone face a significant constraint on their ability to address
the habeas problem because of their duty to honor the State's
constitutional principles at the expense of its international
agreements, the international community would be justified in taking
unilateral steps to prevent convicted war criminals from being
released as the result of an unforeseen conflict of laws.
C.

Expedient UnilateralSolutions to the Habeas Problem

Adopting a solution is of paramount importance since the
habeas problem could undermine the principal goal of establishing an
international court in Sierra Leone-fulfilling the obligation to
punish serious violations of humanitarian law.112 Two approaches
present themselves that would resolve the dilemma by limiting the
power of the domestic courts of Sierra Leone. As the Special Court
could adopt these approaches unilaterally, both solutions are
expedient and thus attractive in light of the institution's core
mandate.
1.

Removing a Habeas Petition Request from Domestic Courts

The Special Court has two legal avenues for stripping
national courts of their jurisdiction to consider prisoners' habeas
petitions. A legally tenuous, unilateral approach consists of barring
the courts of Sierra Leone from reviewing the legality of the Special
Court's operations or decisions. 113 Article 17 of the Agreement
between the United Nations and the Government of Sierra Leone
requires that the government "cooperate with all organs of the
Special Court at all stages of the proceedings""11 4 and "comply
without undue delay with any request for assistance by the Special
violation is only manifest "if it would be objectively evident to any State or any international
organization conducting itself in the matter in accordance with the normal practice of States
and, where appropriate, international organizations and in good faith." Id. art. 46(3). As the
habeas problem has not heretofore been described, it was clearly not objectively evident to
every party at the time that the Agreement was established. Therefore, the Government of
Sierra Leone, while bound by its own Constitution to release amnestied prisoners in its
custody, has outstanding international obligations that are inconsistent with this duty.
112. See S.C. Res. 1315, pmbl., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1315 (Aug. 4, 2000) (recognizing that
the Court was established to reaffirm "that persons who commit or authorize serious
violations of international humanitarian law are individually responsible and accountable for
those violations and that the international community will exert every effort to bring those
responsible to justice in accordance with international standards of justice, fairness and due
process of law...").
113. See Kleffner & Nollkaemper, supra note 6, at 372.
114. Special Court Agreement, supra note 2, art. 17, § 1.
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Court or an order issued by the Chambers ... "115 It may be argued
that this language should be read broadly as imposing a duty to
cooperate that extends "not only to the 'government' in the narrow
sense but more broadly also to other branches of the state of Sierra
Leone with functions other than executive ones." 116 Read in this
fashion, the provision would arguably exclude review of Court
I 17
decisions by the judicial branch of the Sierra Leonean government,
and thus preclude the judiciary from entertaining habeas motions.
Under the Article, the Special Court could simply demand that the
domestic courts relinquish their power to hear habeas petitions,
framing the demand as a "request for assistance."
In order to avoid this expansive reading of the Agreement
whereby any judicial review of Court protocols would be barred, the
Special Court may request that the Sierra Leonean courts defer to the
1 18
competence of the Special Court with respect to a habeas petition.
The Special Court Statute allows that "[a]t any stage of the
procedure, the Special Court may formally request a national court to
defer to its competence in accordance with the present Statute and the
Rules of Procedure and Evidence." 119 Rule 9 provides that "[w]here
it appears that crimes which are the subject of investigations or
proceedings instituted in the courts of a State ... [f]all within Rule

72(B), [t]he Prosecutor may apply for an order or request for
120
deferral."
Once a habeas petition is removed from domestic courts
through either of these steps, the Special Court could arguably
extinguish it without regard for Sierra Leone's constitutional
commitments. A habeas petition brought before the Special Court
may be deemed to satisfy the common law entitlement to the writ of
habeas corpus enshrined in the Constitution. However, unlike
domestic courts, for which the Constitution is the supreme law, the
Special Court would adjudicate the petition according to the Special
121
Court Statute, under which amnesty is not a bar to prosecution
The Special Court could therefore conclude that the protection of
pardons in the Sierra Leonean Constitution is void insofar as it
conflicts with the temporal jurisdiction specified in Article 1(1) of the

115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

Id. art. 17, § 2.
Kleffner & Nollkaemper, supra note 6, at 372.
Id. at 372.
Id. at 367.
Special Court Statute, supra note 18, art. 8, § 2.

120.

RuLEs OF PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE 9.

Rule 72(B) encompasses "objections

based on abuse of process," which would presumably include a petition for the writ of
habeas corpus. Kleffner & Nollkaemper, supra note 6, at 367.
121.

SIERRA LEONE CONST. ch. 13, § 171, cl. 15.
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122
Special Court Statute.
Even granting its legal validity, however, removing petitions
to the Special Court may fail as a sustainable option for addressing
the habeas problem. First, prisoners may simply wait until the Court
has disbanded before filing a petition. The Agreement predicating
the existence of the Special Court is to "be terminated by agreement
of the Parties upon completion of the judicial activities of the Special
Court."' 123 Once the Court ceases to exist, the prisoner's only
recourse for bringing a habeas petition would lie in the domestic
courts of Sierra Leone. Thus, a patient prisoner may simply wait out
the duration of the Court's existence before protesting the illegality
of his confinement.
Second, the Government may simply refuse the Court's
request to remove a petition. As a legal matter, any request by the
Special Court that a Sierra Leonean court defer to its jurisdiction
requires the discretionary cooperation of the Sierra Leonean
Government. The Special Court Agreement stipulates that where
"pursuant to Article 8 of the Statute of the Special Court, the
Attorney-General receives any request for deferral or discontinuance
in respect of any proceedings, he shall grant the request, if in his
opinion there are sufficient grounds for him to do so." 124 The
Attorney-General could make a colorable argument that a Special
Court hearing does not satisfy a prisoner's constitutional right to the
writ of habeas corpus. Though the current government would
presumably be inclined to assist the Court, the Attorney-General of a
future government that is hostile to the Court's existence is left with
the discretion to refuse a request for deference.

2.

Incarcerating Prisoners Outside of Sierra Leone

A quick solution to the habeas problem that lacks the pitfalls
associated with removing petitions from the domestic courts consists
simply of sentencing Special Court prisoners to confinement outside
122. In dismissing the habeas petition brought before the Special Court by Alex Tamba
Brima, the Trial Court judge declared that "the Special Court of Sierra Leone holds it [sic]
existence, not to the Constitution or to the Parliament of the Republic of Sierra Leone, but
solely to the Security Council Resolution No: 1315 2000 . . . and the International
Agreement between the United Nations and the Government of Sierra Leone which set it
up." Brima, Trial Court Habeas Petition, supra note 6, at 10. Thus, the Sierra Leonean
Constitution "is only limited to the Courts created by the 1991 Constitution of Sierra Leone
and not to a post 1991 international creation that owes it [sic] existence to an international
instrument of the security council and an equally International Agreement between the
United Nations and the Government of Sierra Leone." Id. at 11.
123. Special Court Agreement, supra note 2, art. 23.
124. Special Court Ramification Act, supra note 2, art. 14 (emphasis added).
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of Sierra Leone. Such an approach would avoid the legal and
temporal complexities associated with removing petitions from
domestic courts since, as a legal matter, placing Special Court
prisoners beyond the reach of Sierra Leonean law is relatively
straightforward. As addressed in Part I.C, the Special Court Statute
125
provides that "[i]mprisonment shall be served in Sierra Leone."
However,
[I]f circumstances so require, imprisonment may also
be served in any of the States which have concluded
with the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
or the International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia an agreement for the enforcement of
sentences, and which have indicated to the Registrar
of the Special Court their willingness to accept
convicted persons. The Special Court may conclude
similar agreements for the enforcement of sentences
126
with other States.
In spite of the provision's drafting history, 127 the nature of the
circumstances contemplated in this clause is not specified in any of
the materials that have legal effect on the Court's operations. The
Special Court would thus have the authority to decide that Sierra
Leone's constitutional protections against imprisonment for pardoned
crimes constitute a circumstance requiring that imprisonment take
place in another State.
However, in view of the putative purposes for the
provision, 128 placing prisoners outside of Sierra Leone to avoid the
country's legal protections would likely be viewed as a troubling
abuse of the Special Court's statutory authority. The primary reasons
for vesting the Court with the authority to sentence prisoners outside
of Sierra Leone seem to stem from the infrastructural and security
deficiencies of the Sierra Leonean prison system, with detention in
Sierra Leone being the normal state of affairs. The removal of
prisoners from Sierra Leone's geographic jurisdiction for the purpose
of avoiding the habeas problem would thus involve manipulating a
statute designed to compensate for the weaknesses of the Sierra
Leonean criminal system, using it instead to circumvent the country's
legal protections of the imprisoned.

125. Special Court Statute, supra note 18, art. 22. § 1.
126. Id. art. 22, § 1.
127. See supra Part I.C.
128. See id.
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UPHOLDING THE IDEALS OF HYBRID TRIBUNALS THROUGH
MEASURED SOLUTIONS TO THE HABEAS PROBLEM

Notwithstanding any practical difficulties, approaches to the
habeas problem that circumscribe the power of the domestic courts of
Sierra Leone needlessly sacrifice the ancillary goals of a hybrid
tribunal in the service of the primary goal of prosecuting war
criminals. Though the habeas problem highlights a disturbing flaw in
the institutional design of the Special Court, numerous solutions are
available, and selecting among them offers the opportunity for
critical reflection on the reasons for the Court's existence. In light of
these reasons, the Special Court should be cautious in adopting
unilateral solutions to the habeas problem that destroy its unique
value as a hybrid institution.
This Part argues that an optimal solution to a conflict of laws
between a hybrid court and its host state is one that recognizes both
the legitimizing and capacity-building functions of such a court. In
the case of Sierra Leone, an optimal solution would thus honor the
domestic common law right to the writ of habeas corpus, respect the
constitutional obligation of the Sierra Leonean government to honor
amnesties, and settle the conflict between the temporal jurisdiction of
the Special Court and the amnesty provisions of the Lom6 Accord.
Section A addresses the ancillary goals of hybrid institutions and
considers how the solutions presented in Part II undermine those
aims. Section B offers three measured solutions to the habeas
problem that respect the legitimating and capacity-building functions
of a hybrid tribunal.
A.

The Ancillary Goals of Hybrid Tribunals

Hybrid tribunals that "apply general principles of
international criminal law to crimes against the peace and security of
mankind, and principles of national criminal law to crimes under
domestic law"1 29 have been adopted to address mass atrocities
because of their contextual advantages relative to purely international
or purely domestic tribunals. 130 Specifically, hybrid tribunals have
been celebrated for enhancing a court's legitimacy in the eyes of the
129. See Swart, supra note 4, at 305.
130. See generally Stafford, supra note 2; Antonio Cassesse, The Role of
InternationalizedCourts and Tribunals in the Fight Against International Criminality Law,
in

INTERNATIONALIZED CRIMINAL COURTS: SIERRA LEONE, EAST TIMOR, KOSOVO, AND

CAMBODIA 3 (Cesare P.R. Romano et al. eds., 2004); Dickinson, supra note 3.
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host nation and fostering post-conflict stability by building the
capacity of the host country's legal system. The two expedient and
superficially attractive solutions to the habeas problem introduced in
Part II undermine these functions of a hybrid tribunal, and should
therefore not be adopted if better solutions present themselves.
1.

The Legitimating Function of Hybrid Tribunals

By incorporating domestic law, hybrid tribunals have been
celebrated for enhancing the legitimacy of the international
community's aims in the eyes of the host nation. 131 Hybrid courts
often stem from "the need to assuage the nationalistic demands of the
local population," which happens "when national authorities regard
the administration of justice as an essential attribute of
sovereignty."' 132 In the case of Sierra Leone, the nation has a rich
tradition of jurisprudence stemming from the English common law,
despite its legal stagnancy in the last few decades. The incorporation
of domestic law into the Special Court Statute may be seen as an
international recognition of this tradition. However, if the host
country sees the Court as arrogating responsibility to itself in order to
flout domestic legal traditions, this spirit of cooperation may vanish.
Beyond being normatively unpalatable, abandoning the
legitimating goal of a hybrid tribunal can have dire practical effects
for the institution's operations. For example, consider the option of
removing petitions from domestic courts as a solution to the habeas
problem. By circumventing the fundamental constitutional values of
the host nation, such a solution may offend the State of Sierra Leone
and thus undermine the cooperation necessary to ensure the effective
detention of prisoners. Even if the Court unilaterally barred the
Sierra Leonean courts from reviewing its decisions, the courts may
simply violate the Agreement and refuse to relinquish their authority,
citing their obligation to honor the Constitution of Sierra Leone.
Such a refusal could spark a political crisis with respect to the
relationship between the United Nations and the Government of
Sierra Leone. This in turn would force the international community
to decide whether it would enforce the sentences of Special Court
131. See Cassesse, supra note 130, at 5 (arguing that internationalized, or hybrid, courts
are viable when "there is the need to assuage the nationalistic demands of the local
population"); Dickinson, supra note 3, at 301-08 (addressing the legitimizing function of
hybrid courts); Snyder & Vinjamuri, supra note 99, at 17 (noting the view that domestic
trials may have a greater impact on attitudes in the country where abuses have taken place in
comparison to international tribunals, and claiming that hybrid tribunals aim to accomplish
the goal of dispensing justice locally while maintaining international standards).
132. See Cassesse, supra note 130, at 5.
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prisoners against the wishes of the host government by using force or
coercion to ensure that convicted criminals are not released by
domestic courts. When it manifested a commitment to apply national
law, the United Nations enjoyed the enthusiastic cooperation of the
Government of Sierra Leone, as evidenced by the Agreement
Establishing the Special Court. 133 However, by requiring domestic

courts to relinquish their authority to adjudicate the constitutional
issues of the host nation, this necessary spirit of cooperation may be
lost.
Any approach to the habeas problem that could sacrifice the
legitimating function of the Court should thus be avoided if possible.
While a unilateral solution may be an alluring remedy against the
release of prisoners, its costs are heavy. A sustainable procedural
solution to the habeas problem would require the cooperation of the
Sierra Leonean government and should rely upon legal doctrine that
can be applied by the domestic courts.
2.

The Capacity-Building Function of Hybrid Tribunals

Solutions to a conflict of laws such as the relocation of
prisoners undermine a further foundational purpose of mixed courts:
the development of the host nation's legal capacity. The Special
Court, for example, exists in part to help strengthen the legal system
in Sierra Leone. 134 Pierre Courin, a Justice of the Court, has
contended that "[t]he main objective of the court is to reestablish the
rule of law in this country and then show to the people of Sierra
Leone that justice can be done in this country." 135 Optimism has
been expressed that the structure of the Special Court will enable
Sierra Leonean legal professionals to use and develop principles
pertaining to international human rights law "not only within the
hybrid court but perhaps in future cases in domestic Sierra Leonean
courts as well."1 6 In this respect, the hybrid model of the Court is
preferable to a purely international tribunal in that the international
humanitarian law norms are more likely to penetrate into Sierra
Leonean legal culture than norms applied in a remote tribunal by
foreigners." 137
133. See Shraga, supra note 3, at 19.
134. See Stafford, supra note 2, at 133; Cassesse, supra note 130, at 6; Snyder &
Vinjamuri, supra note 99, at 18 ("Mixed tribunals are intended to help build the institutional
capacity of local judiciaries and thereby strengthen the rule of law."); Dickinson, supra note
3, at 301-08 (addressing the capacity-building function of hybrid courts).
135. See Stafford, supra note 2, at 133.
136. See Dickinson, supra note 3, at 307.
137. Id.
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By adopting sentencing principles that are hostile to the legal
traditions of Sierra Leone, the Special Court would abandon this
mandate. Regardless of the Court's legal evolution, the domestic
courts of Sierra Leone are bound to apply law according to the
Constitution, "and shall not be subject to the control or direction of
any other person or authority."38
However, the decision to
incarcerate prisoners in alternative locations in order to avoid the host
nation's constitutional protections undermines, rather than develops,
the legal principles articulated in the Sierra Leonean Constitution.
Placing prisoners outside of the territorial jurisdiction of Sierra Leone
to avoid conflicts of law thus manifests disrespect for the rights
protections that are established in domestic law and fails to create
precedents regarding how to best reconcile the international
obligations and constitutional protections of the nation.
B.

Solutions to the Habeas Problem that Honor the Ideals of a
Hybrid Court

An effective solution to the habeas problem must be efficient
and practicable in order to preserve the core mandate of the Special
Court. However, in view of the legitimating and capacity-building
function of hybrid tribunals, a measured approach to the habeas
problem must also respect the constitutional prerogatives of the host
government and settle the conflict between the temporal jurisdiction
of the Special Court and the amnesty provision of the Lom6 Accord.
Three categories of such approaches present themselves.
1.

Doctrinal Approaches

The most attractive resolution to the amnesty problem
consists in challenging the constitutional validity of the amnesty
provision of the Lom6 Accord. Extensive attention has been focused
on the Secretary-General's reservation to the amnesties, which served
as the basis for the temporal jurisdiction of the Special Court.
However, it may also be questioned as to whether the President of
Sierra Leone possessed the authority to pardon all participants in the
conflict prior to their being held accountable for atrocities that they
may have committed, and whether the amnesty is still valid after the
abrogation of the Lom6 Agreement by the RUF. 13 9

SIERRA LEONE CONST. ch. 7, § 120, cl. 3.
139. This concern is briefly introduced by Smith, supra note 19, at 134.
138.
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In granting the Lom6 amnesties, the President may have
stretched beyond his constitutional powers. The blanket amnesty
provision maintains that "the Government of Sierra Leone shall also
grant absolute and free pardon and reprieve to all combatants and
collaborators in respect of anything done by them in pursuit of their
objectives, up to the time of the signing of the present
Agreement."' 140 However, it is unclear whether the President of
Sierra Leone is vested with the ability to make this promise. 14 1 The
Constitution of Sierra Leone endows the President with the power to
"grant any person convicted of any offence against the laws of Sierra
' 42
Leone a pardon, either free or subject to lawful conditions."
However, it "does not purport to endow the President with the ability
either to grant a pardon before conviction or to guarantee anyone that
criminal prosecutions will not be brought before them."' 143 The
amnesty provisions of the Lom6 Accord could thus arguably be
unconstitutional and therefore invalid.
As an alternative doctrinal approach, the amnesty provisions
of the Lom6 Accord may be interpreted so that they are consistent
with both Sierra Leone's constitutional obligations and its
international commitments under the Special Court Statute. The
amnesty provisions stipulate that combatants shall receive "pardon
and reprieve

. . .

in respect of anything done by them in pursuit of

their objectives."' 44 Atrocities that were committed against civilians
could plausibly be declared beyond the scope of a legitimate military
objective; if so, the Lom6 amnesties would not protect their
perpetrators from prosecution. 145 While this argument has not been
raised by those seeking to break the amnesty agreement, 146 it may
merit scrutiny.
The principal advantage of these doctrinal approaches is that
they resolve a troublesome conflict of laws by developing, rather
than stifling, constitutional jurisprudence in Sierra Leone. The clash
between the amnesty provisions of the Lom6 Accord and the
temporal jurisdiction of the Court demonstrates an embarrassing
tension between the needs to punish criminals for mass atrocities and
to rebuild the Sierra Leonean legal system. A careful and textuallygrounded analysis of the constitutional obligations of the State can
140. Lom6 Peace Accord, supra note 9, art. 9, § 2.
141. See Smith, supra note 19, at 134.
142. SIERRA LEONE CONST. ch. 5, § 63, cl. 1(a) (emphasis added).
143. Smith, supra note 19, at 134.
144. Lom6 Peace Accord, supra note 9, art. 9, § 2.
145. See Gallagher, supra note 11, at 163 (introducing the argument that atrocities
against civilians may be beyond the scope of the Lomd amnesties).
146. See Schocken, supra note 2, at 441.
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work to resolve this clash while respecting the legal tradition of
Sierra Leone.
This approach may be adopted either by the domestic courts
or by the Special Court, if it chooses to remove a habeas petition
from the national court system. If the domestic courts of Sierra
Leone were to dispose of a habeas petition in this fashion, it would
serve to develop the nation's constitutional jurisprudence and align
its constitutional commitments with its political needs. If the
approach were adopted by the Special Court in removing a habeas
petition from the domestic courts, it could counterbalance the affront
felt by the host state by manifesting respect for the constitutional
obligations that are triggered by the sentencing provisions in Article
22 of the Special Court Statute. The Court need not retract from its
position that the force of the Constitution "is only limited to the
Courts created by the 1991 Constitution of Sierra Leone." 147 The
Court would instead recognize that the Special Court Statute
incorporates domestic law with respect to the detainment of
prisoners, and that habeas petitions are thus owed a constitutional
analysis. Regardless of which court adopts the doctrinal approach, it
would serve to resolve a worrisome legal tension and develop Sierra
Leone's legal infrastructure.
2.

Political Approaches

The international community could also encourage the
Government of Sierra Leone to resolve the issue politically through
two approaches. 148 First, the Government could renounce the
amnesty provisions of the Lom6 Accord.
International law
concerning the invalidation of bilateral treaties would allow the
Government to renounce the pardons without shame. Because the
Lomd Accord was a bilateral agreement between the Government of
Sierra Leone and non-state
rebels, with the UN signing only as a
"moral guarantor," 149 it is sensibly read as creating no international
147. Brima, Trial Court Habeas Petition, supra note 6, at 11.
148. The prospect of solving the habeas problem through a third political approachalteration of the Constitution-is appealing at first blush. However, Section 108 of the
Sierra Leone Constitution makes the alteration of provisions under Chapter III of the
Constitution (where the protections against pardons are accorded) difficult. Alteration of
such provisions requires the publication of the proposed amendment in at least two issues of
the Gazette (the State's annual list of laws), a two-thirds majority vote in Parliament, and
approval in a referendum. See SIERRA LEONE CONST. ch. 6, § 108. A Constitutional
Amendment would therefore be a relatively slow and therefore unfeasible solution to the
habeas problem.
149. See Schocken, supra note 2, at 441. The author of this Note is not aware of any
academic literature on whether the U.N.'s participation in the Lomd Peace Accord as a
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obligations on the part of the Sierra Leonean government. 150
However, even if the participation of the United Nations in the
Accord was deemed to create a treaty governed by the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties between States and International
Organizations or between International Organizations, the
Government of Sierra Leone would be entitled to withdraw from the
Agreement. Although the Accord required the disarmament of both
151
the RUF and the forces loyal to the Government of Sierra Leone,
the rebels refused to comply and widespread atrocities continued to
occur. 152 The Vienna Convention stipulates that a "material breach
of a bilateral treaty by one of the parties entitles the other to invoke
the breach as a ground for terminating the treaty or suspending its
operation in whole or in part."' 153 Therefore, the Government may
simply terminate the treaty and eliminate the amnesty problem.
However, the political solution may prove problematic as the
trials for Special Court defendants are already underway. The
Constitution holds that "no person shall be tried for a criminal
154
offence if he shows that he has been pardoned for that offence."
At the time that the trials for the Special Court defendants began, the
Government of Sierra Leone had not renounced the amnesty
provisions of the Lom6 Accord. 155 Thus, it may be argued that, since
the pardon was in effect while the trial was occurring, the trial is
nevertheless void. Consequently, this political approach is not as
doctrinally safe as invalidating the amnesties on constitutional
"moral guarantor" establishes the agreement as a treaty under international law. An
extensive analysis of this point is beyond the scope of this Note.
150. For the Special Court's analysis of the invalidity of the Lom6 Accord as an
international instrument in Prosecutor v. Kallon, Case No. SCSL-2004-15-AR72(E) (Mar.
13, 2004) and Prosecutor v. Karma, Case No. SCSL-2004-16-AR72(E) (Mar. 13, 2004);
Prosecutor v. Kamara, Case No. SCLS 2003-10-PT; and Application by Brima Bazzy
Kamara in respect to Jurisdiction and Defects in Indictment (June 16, 2003), see supra note
21. Positing that the U.N. is not a party to the agreement by virtue of its role as a "moral
guarantor," the Court's argument is largely grounded upon the RUF's lack of legal
personality, and its consequent absence of power to make treaties under international law.
Legal personality under international law is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for the
power to be a party to a treaty. See IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL
LAW 651 (6th ed. 2003). Apart from States, legal personality under international law is
conferred only to international organizations that exist as "a permanent association of states,
with lawful objects, equipped with organs .... " Id. at 649 (describing the criteria of legal
personality in international organizations). The RUF plainly does not meet this criterion.
Therefore, a bilateral agreement between the Government of Sierra Leone and the RUF
would not serve as a treaty under international law.
151. Lomd Peace Accord, supra note 9, art. 16.
152. Macaluso, supra note 7, at 350-51.
153. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 60, § 1, opened for signature May
23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, availableat http://www.un.orglaw/ilc/texts/treaties.htm.
154. SIERRA LEONE CONST. ch. 3, § 23(a) (emphasis added).
155. Jones et al., supra note 6, at 222.
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grounds.
3.

A Procedural Approach

Finally, the prosecutor of the Special Court could drop those
charges in the indictments concerning international crimes committed
prior to the signing of the Lom6 Accord. The indictments currently
in force cite the commission of international crimes committed
subsequent to July 7, 1999.156 By concentrating the prosecutorial
efforts on these charges, the conflict between the Lom6 Accord and
the temporal jurisdiction of the Court would be rendered moot.
However, this approach may be both politically unrealistic
and procedurally undesirable.
The date of the Lom6 Peace
Agreement was deemed politically unacceptable for the
commencement of the Court's temporal jurisdiction, particularly to
the United Nations in light of its disclaimer upon signing the Lom6
Agreement that amnesties would not apply to serious violations of
international law. 157 Indictments have already been submitted
against the defendants in the Special Court. Thus, the prosecutor's
time and the resource commitment devoted to addressing the charges
cited would provide him with strong disincentives from abandoning
his case and renders the approach even more politically unpalatable
than before. Furthermore, a constructive limitation on the temporal
jurisdiction of the Court by the prosecutor is a politically
surreptitious way of handling the conflict of laws between the
international community and the host country, and would do little to
honor the principles that justify the existence of the hybrid court.
CONCLUSION

In light of the important legitimating and capacity-building
functions of the Special Court, an ideal solution to the habeas
problem is one that honors the legal institutions of Sierra Leone and
develops the domestic law. While a number of measured solutions to
the problem present themselves, doctrinal solutions are the most
faithful to the aspirational values that the Court embodies. Through
156. Prosecutor v. Brima, Kamara, & Kanu, Case No. SCSL-2004-16-PT, Further
Amendment Consolidated Indictment (Feb. 18 2005); Prosecutor v. Sesay, Kallon, & Gbao,
Case No. SCSL-2004-15-PT, Amended Consolidated Indictment (May 13, 2004); Prosecutor
v. Norman, Fofana, & Kondewa, Case No. SCSL-2003-14-I, Indictment (Feb. 5, 2004);
Prosecutor v. Koroma, Case No. SCSL-2003-03-I, Indictment (Mar. 7, 2003); Proseucutor v.
Taylor, Case No. SCSL-2003-01-I, Indictment (Mar. 7, 2003).
157. See Smith, supra note 19, at 130.
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taking jurisprudential steps to clarify the scope of either Lom6
amnesties or the Sierra Leonean Executive's constitutional power,
the habeas problem can be resolved even while enhancing the
legitimacy of Sierra Leone's legal structure.
Beyond the narrow issue that faces Sierra Leone, however,
the habeas problem of the Special Court highlights the structural
perils that are faced by any hybrid tribunal. When a hybrid
institution blends domestic law into its legal structure, the
consequences of a legal conflict between the court and the host
nation may threaten to undermine its most central functions. Thus, in
establishing future hybrid tribunals, 158 the international community
should be circumspect in adopting terms of creation that are
obviously in conflict with domestic legal obligations.
However, unforeseen dilemmas in the development of a
hybrid court cannot be remedied ex ante,159 and measured solutions
to such problems require an understanding of the functions and
purposes of hybrid institutions.
The primary purpose of an
international court is of course to ensure that all necessary steps are
taken to fulfill the international obligation to punish mass atrocities.
However, decision-makers must also be mindful of the advantages of
a hybrid court vis-A-vis purely international and domestic tribunals,
and endeavor to ensure that those advantages are not abandoned by
the solution that one adopts. Thus, when a modest and doctrinallybased solution to a conflict of law problem presents itself, it should
be favored over a solution that aggrandizes the court's power at the
expense of the legal prerogatives of the host nation. This modest
approach serves to preserve the legitimacy of the court in the eyes of
the nation, as well as develop the legal infrastructure of the host state.
Anthony O'Rourke*

158. Hybrid tribunals have been proposed for Iraq, Cambodia, and the Democratic
Republic of Congo. See William W. Burke-White, InternationalLegal Pluralism, 25 MICH
J. INT'L L. 963,976 (2004).
159. See Rumsfeld, supra note 1, at 14-17.
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